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Foreword
The China Society presents this summary as
an aid to the understanding of the present sit·
uation in China.
Dr. Hornbeck, author of "Contemporary Pol·
itics in the Far East," Lecturer on History of
the Far East at Harvard University, Technical
Adviser to the American Delegations at the
Paris, the Washington and the Peking Confer·
ences, is recognized as one of the foremost au·
thorities on the politics of the Far East.
A part of this survey appeared in the Bulletin
of the Institute of Pacific Relations, January,
1927.

The Situation In China
By

STANLEY

K. HORNBECK

China is today in the throes of two great political
efforts. First, rival leaders or factions are contending for power; some are struggling to extend, others
to preserve the measure of authority which they
have attained during the years since the overthrow of
the Monarchy ( 1912). Second, most of those who,
in China's vast population, are politically articulate
are in revolt against the influence which foreign
governments, foreign nationals and foreign ideas
have acquired in their country.
The wars which have been waged during the past
ten years have been factional. Various leaders,
groups and parties have been contending for a supremacy to which none has a lawful claim. Each has
raised armies, collected revenues, and waged his or
its contest against one or more of the others. A semblance of central authority has been maintained in
Peking; but at this moment even the Peking government is self-appointed and has a narrowly limited
authority. The city of Peking is fought for as a
political prize, because: first, it is the traditional seat
of authority; second, it possesses the physical equipment of government; and, third, certain of the more
important .sources of revenue still contribute to the
exchequer located there.
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During the past fourteen years, some eight political leaders have held the highest office in Peking;
some forty-two recognizable Cabinets have functioned there; and some nine Parliaments have met.
At the present moment there is no recognized Chief
Executive. There is no Parliament in being. There
is no constitution in force. There is no uniform
system of laws. The work of elaborating new codes
of law on western models has been carried forward, and several of the codes have been declared
in effect by Executive Mandate, but there are gaps,
and certain codes which are nominally in effect
have not been adopted by the recognized legal processes prescribed in any of the Constitutions which
have been, from time to time, in effect.
Governments at Peking have been made and unmade by military leaders. In 1924 President Tsao
Kun's Government was overthrown by a coup
d'etat manipulated by Feng Yu-hsiang, the "Christian General." Feng imprisoned Tsao Kun, and
then, by agreement with Marshal Chang Tso-lin,
of Manchuria, placed Tuan Chi-jui in authority as
"Provisional Chief Executive." Tsao was held
prisoner in the palace until, in the spring of 1926,
Feng's forces were driven from Peking; he was
then released, but was not restored to office. When,
in April 1926, the combined forces of Chang Tsolin and Wu Pei-fu took Peking, Feng's forces
withdrew to the northwest, and the Provisional
Chief Executive, Tuan Chi-jui, left Peking hurriedly and unceremoniously. For several days there4

after there existed no "central government." Finally
a number of experienced officials and military leaders, constituted themselves, with the assent of four
northern "war lords," an acting government, with
the designation "Regency Cabinet."
There were at that time upon the stage four outstanding ·military leaders. Each had his own army,
each his own principality. In Manchuria, with
seat of government at Mukden, Marshal Chang
Tso-lin. Chang's power extended into the metropolitan Province of Chihli and into Shantung, and
he had a substantial measure of authority, but not
control, in Peking. In central China, with base
on the Peking-Hankow Railway, Wu Pei-fu. Wu
was in command of a coalition of military forces
no unit of which was absolutely his own. Chang
Tso-lin and Wu Pei-fu had cooperated in driving
the "People's National Army" of Feng Yu-hsiang
from Peking. Wu thus shared with Chang an influence at Peking. West of Kalgan, Feng Yuhsiang was in control of an indefinite area spoken
of as the "Northwest." In central eastern China,
north and south of the Yangtze River, Sun Chuangfang had effected a coalition of military forces
which gave him supreme command but by no means
unassailable authority in five rich provinces. In
the South, that is Kwangtung and its hinterland,
Chiang Kai-shek, commanding the armies of the
Kuo Min Tang ("Nationalist Party") had consolidated his power, with the aid of Russian advisers
and officers (of Soviet persuasion), and was preparing for a campaign northwards.
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At Canton there had been developed since 1917 a
government which claimed, as did the government
at Peking, to be the government of (all) China.
There Dr. Sun Yat-sen had been elected "President
of China" ( 1921). There, shortly before his death,
Dr. Sun had decided to accept assistance from Soviet
Russia-a decision which produced a schism in his
party-and had entrusted to General Chiang the
task of creating an army with which to "unify" the
country. The administration of Canton by the N ationali st Government had been favorably commented on by many observers.*
The long threatened northward advance ("march
on Peking") of the Canton forces was launched
early in the summer of 1926. Chiang Kai-shek's
army took Changsha, crossed the Yangtze above
Hankow, took Hanyang and its arsenal, then took
Hankow, and later, after a siege of several weeks
took Wuchang, and, proceeding down the river,
took Kiukiang. The success of his armies increased
Chiang Kai-shek's prestige and so materially damaged Wu Pei-fu that not a few observers declared
the latter "finished." Chiang has since pressed on,
south of the Yangtze, and has just now (March 21,
1927) taken the region around Shanghai.
Although it should be clearly understood that
these military operations are not those of a revolutionary organization seeking to overthrow a legitimate government, it should not be thought that
•nr. Sun died in Peking in March , 1926, on the eve of a conference which he
was to have had with northern "War Lords".

6

there is no more underlying all this act1v1ty than
the interests and ambitions of the military leaders.
There is a clash of ideas. There is a contest between comparatively conservative and comparatively radical groups. It is not, as it is so often
put, a struggle between North China and South
China. There is no political or economic line of
cleavage in China. There is no party which is
confined to the South; and there is no party which
controls all of the North. One party, however, has
nation-wide affiliations and has in every province
some influence. This is the Kuo Min Tang, or
Nationalist Party. The other parties are composed
on a basis either of personal or of territorial affiliations. The Kuo Min Party may be said to embody
the spirit of the "revolution"; it carries on from
the overthrow of the monarchy; it has a "platform"; it talks of "popular government"; it represents the undisciplined and enthusiastic desire of a
portion of the population of every province to break
with tradition and throw off restraining and retarding influences.
It is, naturally, from the ranks of this party and
its leaders that the most insistent of the fulminations of the Chinese against foreigners, foreign influence, foreign powers, emanate. In it are enrolled the majority, but by no means all, of the
"western educated" students. It flourishes most in
the South,-for the southern Chinese are by temperament more revolutionary, more ardent than the
northern Chinese, and South China has known more
7

of foreign contact and influence than has North
China. From South China have gone most of
China's emigrants; and from these emigrants there
has come back into China a steady stream of agitation and funds for revolutionary enterprises. South
China has been the birthplace of most of the revolutions of the Chinese against their Rulers, and in
South China the spirit of revolt is most acute today.
But it should not be thought that the Kuo Min
Party and the South are alone indoctrinated with
the ideas of revolt which are becoming daily more
and more manifest in China. Chinese everywhere
have shown during the past ten years increasing
signs of a developing national self-consciousness.
Ten years ago one heard in the foreign "concessions" a general damning of the Chinese as a people possessed of no patriotism. Today one hears
in the same places a general damning of Chinese
nationalism. There is unquestionably developing
in China that conception of national interests and
national rights which is called "patriotism." Not
every Chinese, not one in ten, perhaps not one in
a hundred, has what we would call a "consciousness" or even an opinion with regard to political
questions. The "public" consists of at most a few
million citizens, those who either are educated or
possess substantial means or wield military power.
These constitute articulate China. Politically speaking, they are the nation. Their number is sufficient
to constitute what would be a considerable body
politic in any state. Among them there is develop-

s

ing, more and more, a solidarity of sentiment which
has manifested itself for two decades in defensive
effort to resist foreign influence and which is now
manifesting itself in thought and action directed
toward the destruction of the privileged position
which has been accorded to or acquired by foreign
nations and foreign nationals in China.
The Chinese "Nationalists" are taking advantage
of every evidence and opportunity to proclaim
aloud to their own people and to the world that
China has been and is being oppressed by the foreign Powers; that China is bound down by "unequal treaties"; that Chinese laws, customs, and
manners are being corrupted by foreigners; and that
foreign domination must be shaken off. The present antipathy of the Chinese people appears to be
not against foreigners as individuals or as alien persons but against the forces, the system, the theories
and practices of government of the foreign nations
as manifested in relationships with · China.
The Occident went to the Orient uninvited and
unwanted. Navigators, merchants, missionaries and
soldiers from the Occident forced themselves upon
an unwilling Siam, an unwilling Japan and an unwilling China. Of these countries, China, with her
huge area, her enormous population, her laissezfaire practices and principles of government, has
not yet made the readjustment for which the new
contacts call. The Chinese have never been accustomed to precision, exact definitions, legal prescriptions and contracts written out and agreed upon in
9

minute detail. In the dispensation of justice much
of their law is to be found in the minds of the
magistrates. In the making of contracts much is
left to the attitudes and needs of the parties when
performance becomes due. The Occidental found
China's laws, conceptions of justice, methods of administration different from those of the West. He
found Chinese customs, conceptions of propriety,
methods of doing business different from his. He
found Chinese religions, conceptions of human obligations and methods of performance different
from his. Where Chinese ideas and practices have
differed from those of the Occident, the man from
the West has insisted, in nine cases out of ten, that
the Chinese idea is wrong and the Western right.
A century and a half ago, the Chinese knew
nothing about foreign governments, constitutions,
republics, representative government, separation
of powers, etc. They knew nothing of international law. They had no treaties (except certain old agreements with Russia) . The West
insisted that they learn the.se things, taught them,
and forced them to sign treaties. The Powers insisted that China adopt and maintain a fixed schedule of customs duties; they insisted that the Chinese
admit Christian missionaries, allow them to preach
and teach without obstacle and permit them to buy
and own land wherever they might please for the
prosecution of their enterprises. They insisted that,
inasmuch as Chinese laws were different, those laws
should not apply to "foreigners." Nevertheless,
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they have sought constantly to bring it about that
Chinese laws be altered upon the model of the
Occidental legal systems.
Foreign influence and foreign pressure contributed to bringing on the revolution of 1911. Revolutions the Chinese had had before, ·p lenty of them,
but never one which at the same time overthrew a
dynasty, declared against the principle of monarchy,
and undertook to establish a government based on
principles of election, representation and responsibility.
When the governments of the foreign Powers
dictated the provisions of the treaties which they
compelled the Manchu rulers of China to sign,
they wrote into these treaties some provisions calling for performance which neither the Manchus
nor any other Chinese government could enforce.
Now, the Manchus and the Mandarinate who
signed those contracts have disappeared. Today
the Chinese people are convinced, rightly or wrongly, that the rules and treaty provisions which the
foreign governments cite as rightfully applicable
to the contacts between China and the foreign Powers are inequitable and intolerably disadvantageous
to one of the parties concerned, namely the Chinese.
Moreover, they contend that neither the Chinese
people nor the officials who represented them ever
agreed to some of the provisions in the sense of the
interpretations which foreigners have chosen to put
upon them.
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At the Washington Conference (1921-1922) steps
were taken and agreements were entered into looking toward the revision and adjustment of various
of the treaty provisions. Among other things it was
agreed that the rates of duty of the Chinese treaty
tariff should be increased and that a Commission
should be created to examine China's laws, courts,
prisons and administration of justice, and to report
on facts and make recommendations in relation to ·
the problem of legal jurisdiction in China.
The Special Conference on the Chinese Tariff
met in October, 1925, and worked for nine months.
It did not succeed in arriving at the agreements
· necessary to carry out the provisions of the Washington Treaty. The nearest approach to definite
action by the Conference was the adoption by the
Delegates on November 17, 1925, of a resolution,
the substance of which was intended to be incorporated in a treaty, declaring that China should be
permitted to enjoy tariff autonomy, putting a national tariff law into effect, in 1929, and that China
should abolish the system of levying internal duties
upon merchandise in transit. Inasmuch as the
treaty has not been negotiated, this resolution has,
presumably, no legal standing, but its adoption
has had the effect of giving the Chinese the impression that their right to enjoy tariff autonomy
has been admitted and affirmed by qualified representatives of the foreign Powers.
In July, 1926, the Tariff Conference adjourned
sine die. For months there had been no formal full
12

sessions. The delegates of the foreign Powers had
stayed on in Peking, in spite of wars which were
waged around the capital, while the Government
fell, while the Provisional Chief Executive and
seven of the original ten Chinese Delegates left,they had stayed on, hoping that a new treaty might
be negotiated. The adjournment came not because
the Powers had not wanted and had not tried to
carry out and go beyond-far beyond-the provisions of the Washington Treaty; it came because
and not until after the Nationalist Government
(Canton) and the People's National Army ( Feng
Yu-hsiang) served notice in the middle of July
that they would respect no treaty, no matter what
the provisions, entered into by the P~king authorities. Before the adjournment, the delegates of the
foreign Powers declared unanimously that they
would be glad to go on with the Conference whenever the Chinese Delegates should be in position to
resume the negotiations.
The Commission on Extraterritoriality met in
January, 1926, pursued its investigations, and produced in the middle of September a report signed
by all of the Commissioners. The text of this report was made public in December ( 1926). In it
the Commissioners have given an accurate account
of the laws and the! administration of justice in
contemporary China. They have made suggestions
with regard to steps which should be taken both by
China and by the foreign Powers to bring about a
situation in which it may be safe to abolish the
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extraterritorial system; also, suggestions with regard to the removal of abuses while the system continues in existence. Among other things, they have
pointed out that the new codes have not been put
into effect by legally prescribed processes, that some
have not been put into effect at all, that some are
not yet completed, and that the work of preparing
some has not even been begun.
This whole problem of legal reform in China is
one which presents great difficulties. Chinese conceptions of law, justice, punishment, etc., differ
radically at some points from those of the Occident.
Even among nations in the Occident, there are substantial differences. Yet the effort is being made to
produce in and for China a body of laws which
will meet with the approval of all of the important
Treaty Powers. China's new codes are being based
principally upon French and German models or
Japanese adaptations thereof. The inevitable result
has been and will be that the codes contain many
provisions which are not an outgrowth of Chinese
thought and experience, which are inconsistent with
Chinese conceptions, and which will run counter to
traditional Chinese habits and practices. If China's
new laws satisfy the foreigners, will they be suited
to the Chinese? If they are suited to the Chinese,
will they satisfy the foreigners? Can there be produced a system of law which, both as to regulations
and administration, can be applied equally, with
justice and with satisfaction, to the Chinese people
and to the nationals of some twenty foreign Powers
who reside, travel and do business in China?
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Thus, notwithstanding the pledges made and the
steps which have been taken looking toward their
fulfillment, the simple fact remains that up to this
moment nothing conclusive has been accomplished
in reference to the general program of treaty revision (i.e. in reference to the old commercial and
other treaties) for which the Chinese contended at
Paris eight years ago.*
The Treaty Powers have, however, done much
during the past ten years toward giving up special
rights and privileges. At Paris, the German and
Austrian privileges (except Shantung) were surrendered back to China. At Washington (and immediately after), Shantung was restored; the foreign post-offices were removed; negotiations were
begun for restoration of Weihaiwei; provisions
were agreed upon to ensure respect for China's
sovereignty and discontinuance of foreign aggressions. Most of the Powers have either given up their
rights in or remitted their shares of the Boxer indemnity. At Peking a real effort was made to solve
the tariff problem. The Extraterritoriality Commission produced a substantial body of practical
suggestions and recommendations. In January 1927
the Mixed Courts at Shanghai were turned over
to the Chinese authorities. The foreigners at Shanghai have taken definite steps toward admitting
Chinese to participation in the government of the
International Settlement. t
*Negotiations with regard to several of these treaties have recently been entered
into between China and the foreign Powers individually concerned.
tThe Chinese now demand a "S0-50" representation.
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Banditry is ever present in China, and rebellion
in some part or parts of the country is almost a
.chronic condition. There would probably be civil
warfare in China today even if there had been no
foreign influence, even if there were no ·treaties.
The late Manchu dynasty and Chinese officialdom
have a heavy responsibility for the political chaos
which prevails. The charge that the foreign Powers and their nationals are principally responsible
for it will not stand. But to the kind of trouble
which prevails in China today, the impact of the
Occident gave the original impetus, and foreign
Powers and peoples continue to make direct and
indirect contributions. Foreigners constituted themselves China's tutors. Foreigners wrote the treaties.
Foreigners took concessions in China. Foreigners
financed various enterprises in China. Now, solicitous with regard to their privileges, their investments and their trade, some of them participate in
the formation of Chinese political combinations
and contribute to the successes or defeat of Chinese
military leaders, their contribution and participation being determined by their view of the effect
upon interests which they regard as vested. Thus,
for example, notwithstanding the existence of a
diplomatic agreement whereby the governments of
the principal treaty Powers have agreed not to permit their nationals to sell arms to China, the Chinese find it possible to purchase from certain foreign sources, arms, munitions and equipment in any
amount for which they are prepared to pay cash.
16

Of all the foreign governments, that of Soviet
Russia is probably the most active in the prosecution of a positive China policy. Russia is no longer
party to any of the old style treaties . or agreements
with China and the Soviet Government openly
opposes the efforts of all the Powers which seek to
follow the principle of cooperative action. The
objective underlying Russia's China policy appears
to be that of making trouble, trouble for everybody1
trouble particularly for the "capitalistic" states,
trouble for China. It may well be doubted whether
the Soviet leaders entertain any hope of "bolshevizing" China in the sense of making China commumsttc. If they have such hope it will be vain.
But there can be no doubt that they seek to indoctrinate the Chinese with the idea of revoltand in this they are being highly successful. During the past two years they have been the main
foreign support of the People's National army in the
North (Feng) and the Nationalist Government and
army (Canton-Hankow) in the South. They have
supplied money, munitions, advisers and officers.
It is estimated that the various Chinese armies
total in the aggregate between 1,200,000 and 1,500,000 men. The Mukden, Shanghai and CantonHankow forces have their own arsenals, each turning out rifles and small arms ammunition. Mukden has the most extensive ordnance plants and
Chang Tso-lin has equipped his forces with light
field guns and trench mortars. He is building up
a large aircraft equipment. It is generally con17

sidered that Feng and Chiang Kai-shek have the
best trained and best ordered soldiers. Feng has
no independent sources of equipment or supplies.
He has been dependent on Russia. In fighting
quality, it is generally felt that the men of the
north are superior to those of the south, with the
exception of those of Hunan, but in morale the
Nationalist armies are superior. Financially, Mukden and Shanghai are more independent than are
the other centers. Feng controls a relatively infertile and non-lucrative principality. Wu owes
much of his weakness to lack of funds. The Canton-Hankow Government has developed a substantial independent income.
Each of the major military leaders is an absolute ruler, exercising power of life and death and
collecting taxes at will throughout the region over
which he has control, except that, in the region
under control of the Nationalist Government, the
military authority is-in theory at least-subordinate to that of the Executive Committee.
In many of the campaigns money is more decisive than bullets. Both officers and men frequently go over from one side to the other. Cities
fall without a battle. Armies temporarily victorious seem strangely reluctant to follow up and
annihilate the enemy. All the while the people
are made to pay the bills-and the bank accounts
of the "tuchuns" grow.
China's public finances are in a state of complete chaos. Except for the Customs and a portion
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of the Salt revenues, Peking is rece1vmg nothing
from the provinces; taxes everywhere are being
collected by the authorities locally in control and
are being expended almost entirely upon military
activities. The whole of the revenue derived from
the operation of the railroads is taken and expended
in that way. Nothing is being put back into equipment and no new lines are being constructed, except in Manchuria.
Nevertheless, taking the country as a whole, private business appears to increase. This is unquestionably true with regard to foreign trade. The
figures of the Customs revenue show an increase
every year. But the amount of this foreign trade
which is handled by foreign firms located in China
shows relatively a decrease. The Chinese are apparently taking over, bit by bit, the importing and
exporting business. Military operations, banditry,
issues of paper currency and other irregularities
tend to retard the development of trade; but it must
be remembered that only a portion of China's area
. and a part of her people are directly affected by
these factors. Opium is being grown in many
areas in larger amount probably than in any previous period in China's history,-and the armies
take the profits.
Among the adverse effects of the political and
military turmoil, probably the most unfortunate in
the long run is the fact that educational development is at a standstill. China has today only some
19

seven million boys and gir Is in her schools, less
than one in fifty of her population. There never
has been even an approach to adequate provision
for primary schools and middle schools properly
to feed the established colleges and universities, and
in the government colleges and universities there
has not been in recent years a high standard. Now,
almost no provision is being made even for maintenance, to say nothing of expansion. Were it not
for the missionary institutions and the Indemnity
College at Peking (Tsinghua), opportunities for
higher: education in China would be almost entirely lacking. Even the missionary institutions
have suffered greatly and are operating under handicaps. Some have been compelled recently to
close. The revolt against foreign influence, the
general insurgency of Young China, and the sympathetic tolerance of some of the missionary staffs
have produced a tendency tO, despise discipline,
with results seriously detrimental to scholarship.
The latest developments in the domestic military
contest have been the realignment of northern leaders under the direction of Chang Tso-lin in order
to stop the northward advance of the so far victorious Canton-Hankow forces and the steady advance of the latter eastward in the Yangtze Valley
south of the River. Sun Chuan-fang has been
eliminated; Chang Tsung-chang, who succeeded
him in the Shanghai region, has been evicted from
that region; and the Nationalist (Canton-Hankow)
army is in control of the Shanghai area. The for20

eign Powers have at Shanghai substantial naval and
military forces, for the protection of the limited
area (International Settlement and French conces- ·
sian) which is under foreign administrative jurisdiction. The Wu Pei-fu block, Wu himself being
apparently no longer in control of it, still sits
astride of the Peking-Hankow Railway north of
Hankow. Feng Yu-hsiang has advanced southward
through Shensi and his armies lie to the west near
to and constantly menacing the Wu Pei-fu group.
Feng is a member of the Nationalist Party and an
·
ally of the Canton-Hankow Government.
In the revolt against the foreign Powers, the
Chinese have found organized boycotts decidedly
effective and are having resort with increased frequency to strikes. The combination of the two, as
prosecuted at Canton, has had a very serious effect
upon British interests and has visibly affected British policy during the past year. Both the boycott
and the strike are two-edged and dangerous weapons, but the Chinese are more skillful in the use of
defensive than of offensive measures. The recent
propaganda among the masses is forging a weapon
which may prove more dangerous to its creators
than to those against whom it is directed. The
foreign Powers are reluctant to u!e force and may
be expected to do so only to prevent violence.
There is one factor in the domestic struggle
which holds out a substantial promise of improvement. It is the fact that a Nationalist Movement
is in full swing and that this movement is tending
to produce, in the political and military fields,
some· effective organization.
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TheN ationalist Movement is a bigger thing than
the Nationalist Party. The Party is at once one
of the producers and one of the products of the
movement. The Nationalist Government is a child
of the Party. Within the Party and within the
Government there are three factions, the Radicals,
the Moderates, and the Conservatives. TheN ationalist armies are still another thing. There is the
Nationalist Army of Chiang Kai-shek, an instrument of the Nationalist Government ( Hankow),
and there is the People's National Army of Feng
Yu-hsiang, allied with but not controlled by the
Nationalist Government. Each of these is less than
the Nationalist Movement.
There is warrant for optimism over the Nationalist Movement-which is nation-wide and which
extends beyond the field of politics,-because national self-consciousness, expressed in a general
awakening, is making toward progress, toward national unity, toward independence. There is even
warrant for hopefulness with regard to the Nationalist Government. But the oligarchy which has
created and which today is that Government (Hankow) has not yet made itself the de facto ruler of
the major portion of China's territory; nor has it
yet established an effective civil administration
throughout the considerable area which its armies
have occupied.
Events of the past few days (March 20-31), most
conspicuously the attack upon and killing of foreigners at Nanking, suggest that there is within the N ationalist Army indiscipline and lack of authority and
22

indicate that the work of the Propaganda Bureau of
the Left Wing is creating-or has created-an instrument of terror which, unless suppressed, must inevitably alienate the moderately and conservatively
minded elements among both Chinese and foreign
sympathizers with the Nationalist cause.
What may happen next within China, what may
happen as between the foreign Powers and China,
how long it may be before a stable central government is evolved in China, what may be the character
of that government and who its head, time only will
reveal. In considering China's past, present and
future, it is necessary at all times to take into consideration the size of the country and the enormous
number of the population. China is changing
neither very rapidly nor very slowly. Her mass
is such that she can sustain no rapid acceleration
and no rapid diminution of speed. The one thing
that is certain is that she is no longer travelling in
the orbit which marked her course during many
centuries. She has diverged from that line. She
is changing. She will have to undergo much
change before a new stability is reached. Mere
impatience on the part either of her own people or
of foreigners will achieve nothing. Patience on the
part of both, constructive effort on the part of the
Chinese themselves and demonstrated willingness
to assist on the part of foreigners are the only
factors which may serve to shorten the period of
turmoil and readjustment through which, like it
or not, China must go and the world must watch
her go.
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